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Abstract
We use a 1998 - 2004 sample from WHIP in order to study the labor
market transitions of young entrants. We consider seven labor market
states: permanent and temporary employment, apprenticeship, training
programmes, self employment, quasi subordinate jobs and unemployment.
After controlling for individual ￿xed e⁄ects in a dynamic multinomial logit
framework, we ￿nd that heterogeneity partially explains workers￿sorting
among the contracts. State dependence exists in all the labor market
states, but CFLs, apprenticeship and temporary jobs also represent a
port of entry towards permanent employment.
Key words: temporary jobs, port of entry, state dependence
1 Introduction
Temporary workers represent a growing share of the employed workforce in
many European countries. The EU25 average was 11.7% in 1997 and reached
13.7% in 2004 (European Commission [2005]). The highest ￿gures concern Spain
(32.5% in 2004), Portugal (19.8%) and Poland (22.7%), which experienced an
impressive growth in the last few years (the share was 5.8% in 2000). The
empirical evidence shows that the ￿ ows into temporary employment are all but
negligible also in countries with a more stable aggregate pattern: during the
nineties, over 90% of new hires in Spain have been signed under temporary
contracts (Dolado et al. [2002]); in Italy, in the same period, about 50% of
the workers entered the labor market through a ￿ exible job (Berton and Pacelli
[2007]).
Several reasons stand behind this success. De Graaf-Zijl [2005] argues that
the main one concerns the employers, and it is the reduction in ￿ring costs. The
theory (Bertola [1992]) shows that a reduction in ￿ring costs leads to higher
turnover, with ambiguous e⁄ects on the average employment rate; this is exactly
what de Graaf-Zijl ￿nds in her review of the empircal literature. Temporary jobs
1can be attractive from the labor supply standpoint too. Berton and Garibaldi
[2006] and Bover and Gomez [2004] show theoretically that unemployed work-
ers searching for a temporary job experience a shorter unemployment duration;
this result ￿nds empirical support in Berton [2007] for Italy, Van Ours and
Vodopivec [2006] for Slovenia and Bover and Gomez themselves for Spain. Sec-
ondly, ￿ exible contracts should allow to more easily combine work and family
life. The literature seems to be less unanimous about this point; in the examples
quoted by de Graaf-Zijl, agency jobs allow high-skilled British women to work
out a better combination, but job instability is found to negatively a⁄ect fam-
ily formation in the US and Spain. As for Italy - the reference country in our
analysis - Bertolini et al. [2007], through in-depth interviews to young female
workers from the Province of Turin, ￿nd that temporary contracts are seldom a
matter of choice and much more frequently they are the only way to ￿nd a job.
In Italy, the combination between work and family activities is more likely to
occur through part time jobs; ISTAT [2005] uses the Labor Force Survey and
points out that the share of involunary part timers was 30% in 2004; Berton
and Pacelli [2007] ￿nd that women represent a disproportionately high share in
all part time jobs, but stress that almost 85% of all part time jobs in 2002 was
a permanent job.
Our goal is to understand what happens after one enters a temporary job.
Are temporary jobs a port of entry towards permanent employment or do the
workers run the risk of being trapped into temporary jobs1? As de Graaf-Zijl
shows, the stepping-stone hypothesis holds for some countries (Germany, the
Netherlands and UK) but not for others (Spain and the US). As far as Italy is
concerned, results are ambiguous: Gagliarducci [2005] ￿nds that the probability
of ￿nding a permanent job grows with the duration of previous employment
spells, but decreases with its number, so that it is not temporary jobs per se to
be detrimental for future career opportunities, but their repetition. Ichino et
al. [2005] focus on the jobs provided by temporary work agency in Tuscany and
Sicily; their e⁄ect on the probabilty of being employed again eighteen months
later is positive in the former region, but not signi￿cant in the latter. In Contini
et al. [1999] short employment spells are not detrimental for young workers.
Berton and Pacelli [2007] shed a light on the type of contract one gets after an
unemployment spell and, after controlling for limited observed heterogeneity,
they ￿nd descriptive evidence of persistence in the same type. Picchio [2006]
directly face the hypothesis of true state dependence; his evidence supports this
argument, but is limited by the short time span of the analysis and by a wide
aggragation in the types of contracts.
We evaluate the port of entry and the true state dependence hypotheses on
the Italian labor market, in the medium run and in a multi state framework.
1In principle a third possibility should be taken into account: workers could choose a ￿exible
career, made of repeated temporary employment spells. This hypotesis seems to be disregarded
by the literature: all over Europe, temporary workers feel the highest level of future job
insecurity (de Graaf-Zijl [2005]). Moreover, Madama and Sacchi [2007] highlights that in
Italy the social protection system (including pensions, unemployment bene￿ts, maternity,
sickness and family allowances) still does not ￿t ￿exible workers￿needs.
2This allows us to distinguish among contracts with di⁄erent features (perma-
nent, temporary in strict sense, but also trainees, apprentices, agency workers,
quasi-subordinate, self-employed and professionals2) and to include unemploy-
ment as a possible labor market condition. In order to do that WHIP, a large
dataset of work histories built up by LABORatorio R. Revelli from the Italian
social security administration archives, will be used. As for the econometric
approach, we mainly refer to Magnac￿ s dynamic multinomial logit with ￿xed
e⁄ects.
We get three main results: i) individual heterogeneity plays a crucial role in
sorting the workers into the contracts; nonetheless ii) whatever the initial state of
a worker, retaining the same labor contract is always the most likely destination,
even after individual heterogeneity is controlled for. Despite this sound evidence
of state dependence iii) the stepping stone hypothesis cannot be completely
disregarded, in the sense that the transition to permanent employment is more
likely for employed workers than for unemployed individuals.
This paper proceeds as follows: section 2 reviews the theoretical reasons for
persistence and the stepping stone hypotheses, section 3 presents the data and
section 4 the descriptive evidence. Sections 5 and 6 respectively contain the
econometric approach and our main results, whose discussion is in section 7.
Section 8 draws the conclusions. The appendix is dedicated to the institutional
framework.
2 The theoretical framework
Three main reasons stand behind the possibility that temporary jobs represent
a stepping stone into permanent employment:
￿ Temporary jobs can be used as a screening device (O￿ Flaherty and Siow
[1995]). Since ability cannot be perfectly observed, the employers often
decide to post temporary vacancies in order to screen the workers, and
to permanently retain the ones who proved to be more productive. This
mechanism is often called "up or out rules".
￿ Temporary workers may receive on-the-job training that helps them in
the transition to permanent employment. The literature focuses on the
comparison between temporary and open ended contracts. Berton and
Garibaldi [2006] unambiguously show that temporary workers have a strictly
lower probability to receive training. As de Graaf-Zijl writes, "...a ￿rm
with a short term labor force faces a reduced incentive to invest in train-
ing" since "...the costs of training need to be earned back. The shorter
a worker remains with the ￿rm, the shorter the pay back period". The
empirical evidence unanimously supports this hypothesis. Nonetheless, it
is still plausible to assume that temporary workers receive more training
than unemployed individuals; in this respect, we can expect that workers
2See the appendix for the institutional details.
3are more likely to get a permanent job through a temporary one than
through o⁄-the-job search.
￿ Even if no training is provided, temporary jobs allow the worker to build
a network of contacts that in turn increase permanent employment oppor-
tunities.
For some workers temporary jobs may also become a trap, but the literature
does not provide any speci￿c theoretical explanation for such persistence. In
the following, without being exhaustive, we will try to understand when it may
happen.
￿ Let us turn back to the screening framework we brie￿ y depicted above. If
the wage is not ￿ exible enough, and in particular if a minimum wage higher
than the outside option of the less capable workers does exist, adverse
selection cannot be completely avoided and a share of less productive
workers will apply for the vacancy. As long as ability is match-speci￿c or
does not become public information, the workers will go on trying di⁄erent
jobs until an e¢ cient match is found. In this framework the individual
persistence in temporary jobs depends mainly on ability and only a little
on the information about job￿ s characteristics that the worker has; the
minimum wage, infact, makes the screening contract always preferable to
the outside option3.
￿ G￿ell [2000] argues that temporary jobs allow the employers to maximize
workers￿ on the job e⁄ort, as long as this increases the probability of
retention. In this case temporary employment is a generalized policy,
and individual or ￿rm￿ s characteristics do not matter. In other words,
everybody should persist in temporary jobs.
￿ Temporary workers as a bu⁄er to face demand shocks. Pro￿t maximizing
behaviour requires the employers to adapt the workforce to the level of
the demand. If only permanent contracts are available, ￿rms are forced to
ine¢ ciently retain a share of the workforce when demand is low, making
lower pro￿ts. With temporary contracts instead, they are able to ￿t de-
mand conditions. In this framework, individual persistence emerges when
heterogeneous ability is introduced. Highly productive workers are likely
to be pro￿table both during downturns and upturns; therefore, they en-
joy a permanent job. On the contrary, less endowed individuals become
pro￿table only when their productivity receive a positive shock (upturns)
and work only when demand is high.
￿ In Berton and Garibaldi [2006] workers with a low non-labor market op-
tion endogenously sort into the temporary market. The intuition is that
3In Italy the entrants to the labor market are not entitled to the unemployment bene￿t
since a minimum amount of past contributions is required. This principle also excludes many
discontinuous workers (Madama and Sacchi [2007]).
4￿nding a temporary job is easier, and individuals with a more stringent
budget constraint need to earn a wage as soon as possible. As long as the
constraint persists we should therefore observe also persistence in the type
of labor contract. Whether this hypothesis is reasonable is hard to say;
the outside option dynamics (meaning how family income, savings, ￿nan-
cial stocks etc. change in time) is di¢ cult to observe, but as far as wage
is concerned, a non-positive di⁄erence between temporary and permanent
workers is sound evidence (de Graaf-Zijl [2005]). This means that it is
not through a temporary job that one can recover some wealth di⁄erential
with respect to permanent workers.
￿ Tastes and preferences. Persistence in temporary employment is observed
as long as some (possibly many) individuals prefer temporary jobs. As we
have discussed in the introduction, the hypothesis of an easy combination
between work and family life ￿nds some empirical support in Europe, but
not in Italy.
￿ Statistical discrimination (stigma). When productivity cannot be ob-
served, it is possible that employers look at some other individual features
(age, education, experience but possibly also race and gender) as proxies;
this behaviour may induce discrimination upon the workers. In a two-
periods model with a screening step in the ￿rst period and a permanent
job in the second, the candidates coming from the subgroups where the
average ability is expected to be lower are o⁄ered a lower wage. This
means that as long as temporary workers are supposed to be of lower abil-
ity, they receive worse job o⁄ers, whatever their real productivity level.
In countries where wages are rigid, employers reduce the costs through
temporary contracts. At least two mechanisms may induce employers to
believe that temporary workers have lower ability: they receive less train-
ing (see above) and have a lower incentive to invest in human capital (a
sort of self-ful￿lling prophecy). In these cases persistence in temporary
jobs is not due to some (observable or not) individual characteristic, but
to past temporary jobs themselves. These are the cases of what we call
true state dependence.
In real world all these possible interpretations are likely to overlap, but as
Dolado et al. [2002] point out, there￿ s no theoretical approach that is able to
keep altogether. In general, we can say that all such models bring transitions
and persistence back to two broad explanations: heterogeneity and a true au-
tonomous e⁄ect of the speci￿c contract. Our goal is to control for the role of
heterogeneity; residual e⁄ects will be interpreted either as stepping stone or true
state dependence.
3 The data
We use WHIP, the Work Histories Italian Panel, to its full potential. It in-
cludes self employed, quasi subordinate workers, bene￿t recipients as well as
5Table 1: Entry contract in 1998
Entry contract Frequency Males Females Total
no. % % %
Standard 2,336 27.95 31.64 29.61
Temporary 884 9.27 13.57 11.21
CFL 652 8.76 7.66 8.26
Apprentices 1,656 22.42 19.25 20.99
Quasi subordinate 668 6.32 11.09 8.47
Self employees 1,693 25.28 16.8 21.46
Total 7,889 100 100 100
Sam ple in 1998
Standard: p erm anent contract (w /w o subsidies)
Tem p orary: ￿xed term , tem p orary agency, seasonal
C F L : on the job training contract
Self-em ployees: artisans, traders, professional
employees. It excludes only civil servants on a permanent contract, agricultural
workers, high skill professions (e.g. lawyers). It also excludes workers in the
black economy, by de￿nition.
To perform our empirical analysis, we select a ￿ ow sample of entrants in
employment as follows. We select native people under 40 years of age never
observed in employment before 19984, that start their ￿rst paid job during
1998. We then follow them until the end of 2004. We exclude from the analy-
sis entrants with a ￿xed term contract employed in the public sector, as their
eventual transition to a permanent contract in the same public sector would
be unobservable. In this setting, non employment spells can be easily labelled
"unemployment spells", as transitions "back and forth" to non observed con-
tracts are extremely unlikely. We have however to allow for employment spells
in the black economy. On the other hand, when we observe workers receiving
the unemployment bene￿t we are sure about their position.




Table 1 details the entry contract by gender. About 30% of individuals enter
with a standard contract, 20% as apprentices and another 20% as self employees;
about 10% as trainees (CFL), quasi subordinate and temporary.
Gender is a proxy for tastes and a relevant dimension of heterogeneity in
general. Age at entry is a proxy for the initial endowment of ability (education,
eventual experience in the black economy or without a contract, time spent
looking for the ￿rst job). Di⁄erences by gender and age at entry are sizeable.
Females are more likely - with respect to males - to start their working career
4Between 1985 and 1997.
6Table 2: Age at entry
Entry contract 15 - 19 20 - 24 25 - 29 30 - 34 35 - 39 Total
Standard 17.85 32.74 32.28 29.26 36.96 29.61
Temporary 9.96 15.73 10.07 6.4 5.37 11.21
CFL 3.43 10.42 13.94 4.65 0.00 8.26
Apprentices 64.55 22.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.99
Quasi subordinate 1.68 5.92 13.88 13.37 12.58 8.47
Self employees 2.52 12.58 28.74 46.32 44.94 21.46
Total 19.60 35.77 23.29 13.08 8.26 100.00
Column percentages; total: row percantegs
with a temporary or quasi subordinate contract. Modal age at entry (table
2) is between 20 and 24 years. The large majority of younger workers (15 -
19 years old) enter as apprentices. Temporary contracts are entry contract
mainly for individuals under 30 years of age5, while the other contracts and
quasi subordinate ones in particular, are more often the entry contracts of more
mature individuals.
4.2 Transitions
Table 3 shows how the stock of every contract evolves over time. We observe the
position of the individuals in the sample every October from 19986 to 2004; these
are not transitions. We see that unemployment is almost constant, involving
one individual out of four every year. This is in line with an average youth
unemployment rate of 22.6%7 in Italy in those years. Standard contracts double
over the period considered, starting from about 20%8. The number of self
employees is constant over time. CFLs and apprentices decrease sharply, while
temporary contracts increase. Quasi subordinate workers increase after 2001
because of the enlargement of this contract to manual tasks.
Table 4 shows average transition rates in the raw data. Every panel contains
transitions at wider intervals, from one year distance to six years distance. In
general individuals move to the same contract, to a standard contract or to un-
employment; all other transitions are quite rare. Persistence along the diagonal
appears to be substantial. Self employees display the largest one, with levels
fading down slowly at increasing intervals, when a non negligible share move to
permanent employment or to unemployment. Persistence is high for standard
workers too, but it falls more rapidly; permanent workers display a growing tran-
sition rate to unemployment, showing that open ended contracts do not com-
5CFL and appenticeship contracts have age limits, while temporary contract do not. See
the appendix.
6Notice that about 10% of workers starts the ￿rst employment spell in November or De-
cember 1998, and are labelled unemployed in October 1998. Entrants between January and
September 1998 might have changed their position in the meanwhile.
7Referred to 15 - 24 years old in 2003.
8One third of entrants with a standard contract are unemployed in October 1998 because
they enter in November or December of that year.
7Table 3: Composition of the sample every October, by contract
Year U I Standard Temporary CFL Apprentces Quasi sub. Self empl. Total
1998 0.276 0.214 0.057 0.072 0.136 0.052 0.193 1.000
1999 0.265 0.231 0.052 0.077 0.132 0.026 0.217 1.000
2000 0.262 0.291 0.056 0.038 0.123 0.016 0.214 1.000
2001 0.249 0.337 0.050 0.031 0.100 0.016 0.217 1.000
2002 0.231 0.381 0.057 0.023 0.075 0.019 0.214 1.000
2003 0.229 0.405 0.062 0.016 0.055 0.021 0.212 1.000
2004 0.231 0.424 0.067 0.007 0.042 0.016 0.213 1.000
pletely prevent the possibility of losing a job. Temporary and quasi subordinate
workers display lower and decreasing levels of persistence that nonetheless does
not completely disappear at larger intervals; both su⁄er from frequent exit to
unemployment but enjoy increasing transition rates to permanent employment
and self employment respectively9. Training contracts (CFLs) and apprentice-
ship provide for a formal transition mechanism to permanent employment. This
is evident for trainees, whose legal duration is up to 24 months: they experience
a growing transition rate to permanent jobs and a low possibilty of exit to other
contracts, with a degree of persistence that completely fades away at longer
intervals. Apprentices persist longer (the training period is up to ￿ve years)
and display a lower transition rate to permanent jobs. Finally, persistence in
unemployment decreases over time, but it￿ s still at 24% after six years.
The evidence depicted so far mixes up the e⁄ects of heterogeneity, of genuine
port of entry e⁄ects and of true state dependence. In the next section we describe
how we desentangle these components.
5 The econometric strategy
We are interested in dynamic models in which multiple labor market states can
be taken into account. In this framework the main issue in disentangling the
e⁄ect of heterogeneity is the treatment of unobserved components. Continuous
time models are in general more careful about the dynamics of the process
and less on unobserved heterogeneity, which is often described as a random
e⁄ect that multiplicatively enters a proportional hazard. On the contrary, the
discrete time setting allows the introduction of unobserved ￿xed e⁄ects, possibly
correlated with other individual characteristics; the price to pay is a poorer
dynamic speci￿cation: usually, a Markov chain. Since our concern is mainly on
unobserved heterogeneity, we follow the second strategy and use the approach
proposed by Magnac [2000]. The model goes as follows: for each individual
i 2 f1;:::;Ng the latent propensity level y￿
ijt to be in state j 2 f0;:::;Kg at
time t 2 f2;:::;Tg is a function of the lagged state variables and of unobserved
9The separation between quasi subordinate workers and a part of self employees is based
upon an "activity code" that is likely to su⁄er from measurement errors. The transition
intensity between the two states is therefore less reliable.
8Table 4: Average transition rates, row percentages
t-1 U I Standard Temporary CFL Apprentices Quasi sub. Self empl. Total
U I 61.84 14.16 7.47 2.76 6.63 2.42 4.72 100
Standard 11.75 81.56 2.86 0.97 0.82 0.48 1.55 100
Temporary 25.01 26.38 38.41 4.57 2.55 1.22 1.87 100
CFL 11.65 40.54 5.23 39.70 1.09 0.44 1.33 100
Apprentices 15.19 15.54 2.26 1.49 63.87 0.27 1.39 100
Quasi sub. 30.84 11.18 6.22 1.43 1.09 37.14 12.10 100
Self empl 4.69 2.70 0.96 0.22 0.17 0.46 90.79 100
t-2 U I Standard Temporary CFL Apprentices Quasi sub Self empl. Total
U I 49.84 20.51 8.46 3.32 8.52 2.68 6.68 100
Standard 18.06 70.88 4.05 1.85 1.58 0.76 2.81 100
Temporary 30.52 30.65 24.75 5.73 4.21 1.66 2.49 100
CFL 15.02 57.14 4.27 19.06 1.25 0.63 2.63 100
Apprentices 22.33 22.15 3.16 2.61 46.71 0.49 2.54 100
Quasi sub. 37.71 16.28 6.51 3.37 2.07 22.44 11.60 100
Self empl. 7.22 4.51 1.31 0.40 0.24 0.51 85.81 100
t-3 U I Standard Temporary CFL Apprentices Quasi sub. Self empl. Total
U I 41.45 26.25 9.24 2.66 9.05 2.86 8.49 100
Standard 20.77 65.51 4.86 1.84 2.23 0.83 3.95 100
Temporary 28.77 38.15 18.37 4.36 4.83 1.95 3.58 100
CFL 16.41 68.27 4.01 5.36 1.43 0.72 3.80 100
Apprentices 22.54 31.20 3.83 3.05 34.36 0.81 4.22 100
Quasi sub. 38.80 22.40 6.12 2.80 2.41 13.22 14.26 100
Self empl. 9.89 6.99 1.60 0.40 0.32 0.65 80.16 100
t-4 U I Standard Temporary CFL Apprentices Quasi sub. Self empl. Total
U I 34.97 30.87 9.79 2.43 9.11 2.89 9.95 100
Standard 22.77 61.49 5.52 1.70 2.33 1.08 5.11 100
Temporary 26.08 44.44 13.96 3.35 5.37 2.07 4.73 100
CFL 17.86 69.78 3.48 2.35 1.36 0.85 4.32 100
Apprentices 22.67 38.40 4.46 2.88 24.86 1.01 5.71 100
Quasi sub. 35.98 27.83 6.37 2.12 1.84 9.49 16.36 100
Self empl. 12.28 8.82 1.68 0.30 0.36 0.83 75.73 100
t-5 U I Standard Temporary CFL Apprentices Quasi sub. Self empl. Total
U I 29.33 36.32 10.50 1.73 8.27 2.79 11.06 100
Standard 25.13 58.19 5.42 1.47 2.39 1.21 6.18 100
Temporary 24.77 47.70 13.45 2.70 4.14 1.72 5.52 100
CFL 18.02 69.66 3.61 1.42 1.15 1.04 5.09 100
Apprentices 22.70 41.84 5.16 2.73 19.33 1.14 7.10 100
Quasi sub. 32.01 31.39 8.08 1.17 1.32 9.17 16.86 100
Self empl. 14.18 10.44 2.13 0.18 0.39 0.95 71.73 100
t-6 U I Standard Temporary CFL Apprentices Quasi sub. Self empl. Total
U I 24.02 42.21 10.70 0.78 7.63 2.11 12.54 100
Standard 27.34 54.59 6.09 1.19 2.31 1.39 7.08 100
Temporary 23.14 50.41 12.25 2.03 3.91 2.03 6.24 100
CFL 19.89 67.59 3.36 0.74 0.98 1.23 6.22 100
Apprentices 22.80 44.44 6.00 2.34 15.19 1.21 8.02 100
Quasi sub. 30.80 34.04 8.88 0.74 1.30 7.86 16.37 100






￿kj1[yit￿1 = k] + ￿ijt
where the unobserved components ￿ijt are decomposed into an individual and
state-speci￿c e⁄ect ￿ij and residuals uijt. Observed states yijt are the states
with maximum propensity
yit = j if y￿
ijt = Maxk(y￿
ikt)
If the residual components uijt, conditional on ￿ij, are extreme value distributed
and independent across states, individuals and periods, the probability to be in
state j at time t for individual i given that she was in state k in the previous
period, reads
Prfyit = jjyit￿1 = k;￿;￿g =




exp(￿kl ￿ ￿k0 + ￿il ￿ ￿i0)
Identi￿cation requires to set the parameters related to destination state 0,
(￿i0;￿k0), to zero as a normalization constraint. In order to remove the in-





= exp(￿kj ￿ ￿0j)
The state parameter ￿kj is identi￿ed once the additional normalization ￿0j = 0 is
imposed. Quoting Magnac, the interpretation is as follows: "...if ￿kj is positive,
the odds of being in state j with respect to state 0 when the lagged state is
k are larger than when the lagged state is 0". If the true state dependence
hypothesis holds the estimated transition parameters when the lagged and the
current states are equal are larger than when they di⁄er. In principle, state
dependence does not exclude a stepping stone e⁄ect: a positive state parameter
￿kj when the reference state is unemployment means that getting the destination
j is easier if the current state is k instead of unemployment; in this case, labor
market condition k would be a port of entry to j.
Estimation uses a conditional maximum likelihood method. The individual



























1[yit = k] is the number of occurencies of state k for individual i
from time 2 to T ￿1 and B =
￿
b = (yi2;:::;yiT￿1)j8k > 0;
T￿1 P
t=2
1[yit = k] = Yik
￿
10is the set of all the possible state sequences that are compatible with the number
of occurrences of each state. This method compares the work histories that are
equivalent in terms of the number of occurrences but di⁄er for the sequence
of the states. The variability between time 2 and T ￿ 1 is informative about
the transitions among states; for this reason, stable histories do not enter the
likelihood function and at least four periods must be observed.
Our speci￿cation include seven work states (permanent and temporary work-
ers, apprentices, trainees, quasi subordinate and self employed, with unemploy-
ment as the reference condition) and up to seven yearly observations (from 1998
to 2004).
6 Results
We estimate ￿kj at 12 as well as at 24 months intervals (in which case we exploit
the minimum of four observations per individual). U is unemployment and is







Positive (negative) ￿gures mean that the odds of taking contract j with
respect to unemployment when the lagged state is k are larger (smaller) than
when the lagged state is unemployment. Thus, if dk0j > dk00j the odds of taking
contract j (with respect to unemployment) when the lagged state is k0 are larger
than when the lagged state is k00; if dkj0 > dkj00 the odds of taking contract j0
when the lagged state is k are larger than the odds of taking contract j00. In
tables from 5 to 8 the rows compare the odds of taking di⁄erent contracts
keeping the origin state constant; the columns display the odds of taking one
speci￿c contract for di⁄erent lagged conditions. In tables 6 and 8, on-diagonal
coe¢ cients larger than the other elements on the same row are evidence for
the true state dependence hypothesis. Positive ￿gures under the "Standard"
column mean support for a genuine stepping stone e⁄ect.
First of all we notice that almost all ￿gures in tables 5 to 8 have a positive
sign, meaning that entry in any state is in general easier when one was employed
in the previous period. This may be considered empirical evidence for a "net-
work e⁄ect" on the probability of being employed in the future (see section 2)
and lead us to a ￿rst consideration:
Claim 1 Unemployment, with respect to employment, is detrimental in order
to enter almost any labor market state.
Then we can compare dkj measured with raw transitions from table 4 with
estimates that work out individual ￿xed e⁄ects. This comparison is informative
about individual heterogeneity: as long as it plays a role in workers￿sorting
among di⁄erent contracts, we expect dkj to change after time invariant e⁄ects
11are controlled for. Moreover, we expect the coe¢ cient on the main diagonal
to decrease in absolute value, since the same individual characteristics that
sorted a worker into contract j are likely to retain her there furtherly. Our
￿ndings support these hypotheses: both at one (tables 5 and 6) and at two years
intervals (tables 7 and 8) almost all the transition and persistence coe¢ cients
(respectively the elements o⁄ and on the main diagonal) decrease after ￿xed
e⁄ects are controlled for, meaning that most of the raw rates are ampli￿ed by
the individual characteristics. Only at two years distance the heterogeneity
prevents the workers from moving into temporary jobs (column 2 in tables 7
and 8). Therefore:
Claim 2 Individual heterogeneity explains part of the observed raw transition
rates. In most cases the e⁄ect is an overestimation.
Nonetheless, persistence is still far from fading away. Table 6 shows that
for any given contract, the most likely destination state is the same contract,
even after ￿xed e⁄ects have been removed. At one year distance each single
contract duration plays a major role: it￿ s likely to be the case for permanent
jobs, CFLs and apprenticeship, whose maximum legal durations are two and
￿ve years respectively, but not for quasi subordinate workers, who enjoy work
relationships shorter than one year on average. We therefore expect state de-
pendence to decrease in most cases when computed at larger intervals. Table 8
shows what happens at two years distance. The coe¢ cients on the main diag-
onal actually decreas, but still represent the row-speci￿c highest ￿gures. Three
aspects are worth a comment: i) state dependence in CFLs is high even beyond
the maximum legal duration of the contract, meaning that trainees are likely
to experience more than one training spell; ii) state dependence in permanent
jobs falls dramatically, con￿rming that open ended contracts do not completely
prevent a worker from losing her current job; iii) self employment is more likely
to be a choice of the worker; this induces the very high persistence coe¢ cient
we read in the tables.
Claim 3 Whatever the entry state, retaining the same contract is the most
likely destination. This e⁄ect persists after controlling for time invariant indi-
vidual e⁄ects, at one as well as at two years intervals. We interpret this result
as evidence of true state dependence.
Insights about the stepping stone hypothesis are provided by ￿gures in col-
umn one of tables 6 and 8. Notwithstanding the presence of true state depen-
dence, permanent jobs are more easily accessible from employment than from
unemployment, whatever the contract. In particular, CFLs display the highest
coe¢ cient both at one and at two years distance, possibly implying a positive ef-
fect of their formal training content. The objection that employers were forced
by the law to retain at least 50% of the trainees is not relevant since i) the
employers were perfectly aware of that; as a consequence, only highly capable
workers may have been selected for CFLs but ii) unobserved heterogeneity is
12Table 5: d(kj) from raw transition rates, one year interval
Standard Temporary CFL Apprentices Quasi sub. Self empl.
Standard 3.412 0.701 0.615 -0.429 0.043 0.547
Temporary 1.527 2.543 1.410 -0.050 0.220 -0.021
CFL 2.721 1.313 4.335 -0.136 -0.036 0.403
Apprentices 1.497 0.208 0.787 3.669 -0.789 0.181
Quasi sub. 0.459 0.513 0.038 -1.110 3.427 1.637
Self empl. 0.922 0.527 0.050 -1.084 0.919 5.536
From raw estimates
Table 6: d(kj) estimates controlling for individual ￿xed e⁄ects, one year interval
Standard Temporary CFL Apprentices Quasi sub. Self empl.
Standard 2.5804 0.5234 -0.0129 -0.5287 0.3317 0.6092
0.0621 0.0883 0.1349 0.1332 0.1827 0.1426
Temporary 1.1859 1.7534 1.0140 0.0161 0.1711 0.1514
0.0865 0.0931 0.1625 0.1808 0.2326 0.2502
CFL 1.6347 1.2510 3.8665 -0.0825 0.4234 0.4119
0.1174 0.1673 0.1979 0.2830 0.4271 0.2932
Apprentices 0.6545 0.0811 0.2880 2.3152 -1.0055 -0.1967
0.0931 0.1515 0.2018 0.0948 0.4447 0.2588
quasi sub 0.5101 0.6982 0.2921 -0.5515 2.2653 1.5625
0.1603 0.1791 0.3613 0.4621 0.1592 0.1983
self emp 0.7898 0.8068 0.5269 -0.0260 1.0619 3.5493
0.1486 0.2022 0.3482 0.3627 0.2810 0.1273
s.e. in second row s. B old if 95 p ct signi￿cant
controlled for10. Results are signi￿cant for temporary jobs and apprenticeship
too. Quasi subordinate workers and self employees display signi￿cant coe¢ cients
only at one year interval. Thus, we are in a position to state that
Claim 4 The stepping stone hypothesis holds too; in particular, CFLs represent
the best port of entry to permanent employment.
Finally, an ordering among the contracts with respect to the probability of
taking a permanent job seems to emerge. At one year distance all the contracts
display signi￿cant odds of exit to open ended contracts, with the highest ￿gure
for CFLs and the lowest for apprentices and quasi subordinate workers. At larger
intervals self employees and quasi subordinate should take the intermediate step
of a temporary jobs, while among the employees the ordering is unchanged:
CFLs, temporary jobs and apprenticeship.
10Notice also that Magnac [2000] ￿nds the opposite result; in France, training programmes
are not more e⁄ective than o⁄-the-job search in ￿nding a permanent position.
13Table 7: d(kj) from raw transition rates, two years interval
Standard Temporary CFL Apprentices Quasi sub. Self empl.
Standard 2.255 0.278 0.430 -0.670 -0.245 0.149
Temporary 0.892 1.564 1.036 -0.215 0.011 -0.496
CFL 2.224 0.516 2.947 -0.720 -0.248 0.267
Apprentices 0.880 -0.182 0.562 2.504 -0.896 -0.164
Quasi sub. 0.048 0.017 0.294 -1.136 2.404 0.831
Self empl. 0.417 0.067 -0.184 -1.638 0.273 4.485
From raw estim ates
Table 8: d(kj) estimates controlling for individual ￿xed e⁄ects, two years interval
Standard Temporary CFL Apprentices Quasi sub. Self empl.
Standard 1.73 0.50 -0.14 -0.46 0.03 0.55
0.12 0.16 0.23 0.21 0.36 0.27
Temporary 0.70 1.64 0.56 0.71 0.80 -0.41
0.16 0.21 0.32 0.33 0.43 0.52
CFL 1.44 0.89 2.31 0.11 -0.53 0.76
0.19 0.30 0.53 0.44 0.77 0.48
Apprentices 0.33 0.35 0.56 2.01 -1.02 -0.53
0.17 0.25 0.37 0.21 0.65 0.43
Quasi sub. 0.19 0.66 0.90 0.24 1.46 1.04
0.28 0.32 0.70 0.65 0.34 0.38
Self empl. 0.39 0.88 0.95 -0.26 -1.17 3.17
0.29 0.39 0.67 0.75 0.78 0.30
s.e. in second row s. B old if 95 p ct signi￿cant
147 Discussion
In this paper we provide fresh new evidence about the role of temporary jobs as
stepping stone towards permanent employment in Italy. Previous results were
mainly from Ichino et al. [2005]: in a proper policy evaluation framework, they
￿nd that agency jobs represent a stepping stone to employment in Tuscany,
but results are not signi￿cant in Sicily. Despite the sound methodology, their
evidence concerns only two regions (Tuscany and Sicily) and one labor contract
(temporary agency jobs). Picchio [2006] ￿nds true state dependence in tempo-
rary jobs using national data, but his wide level of aggregation does not allow
to distinguish among the contracts (he uses only two categories: temporary
and permanent jobs) and to evaluate the port of entry hypothesis (unemployed
individuals are excluded from the sample).
Using nationwide administrative data we are able to distinguish among a
variety of di⁄erent contracts for the ￿rst seven years after one enters the labor
market. We show that individual heterogeneity matters in sorting the workers
among the contracts; nonetheless, after controlling for time invariant covariates,
we ￿nd evidence of both state dependence and the stepping stone hypothesis.
These results still hold when transitions are computed at intervals larger than
the average or legal duration of most of the contracts; moreover, averaging over
the ￿rst seven years of one￿ s career prevents any possible start up or screening
period bias.
Policy implications must be evaluated carefully. Even if CFLs and, to a
lesser extent, apprenticeship and temporary jobs turn out to be ports of entry,
we are not in a position to say whether a further liberalization would ease the
transition to permanent employment. Flexible jobs, in fact, may even substitute
open ended contracts. CFLs themselves exist since 1984, far before the ￿rst
strong liberalization of the Italian labor market was introduced (1997 with the
"Pacchetto Treu"; see the appendix). Even more surprisingly, the most recent
comprehensive reform (the "Legge Biagi" as it is commonly known) abolished
such training programmes. In other words, our evidence is far from supporting a
direct and positive relationship between labor contract liberalization and entry
into permanent employment.
As for the econometric approach, three considerations are in order. First, we
￿nd evidence both of state dependence and of a stepping stone e⁄ect. The main
question therefore become: how long does a worker take to enter a permanent
job? This involves duration analysis, but, as we discussed in section ￿ve, control-
ling for unobserved ￿xed e⁄ects would become a hard task. Second, the model
proposed by Magnac works out the problem of unobserved heterogeneity in a
very elegant way without any distributional assumption. Nonetheless, it￿ s not
able to take into account the e⁄ect of time-varying covariates. In other words,
the persistence and the transitions we still observe after controlling for ￿xed
e⁄ects, could be due to some individual characeristics that varied in the time
interval we observe. Along the lines of Magnac, HonorŁ and Kyriazidou [2000]
propose a solution to this problem; the conditions for the identi￿cation of the
coe¢ cients of time-varying characterisitcs, however, are really data-demanding.
15Finally, both Magnac and HonorŁ and Kyriazidou do not account for the initial
conditions. In order to minimize such problem, we used a sample of entrants on
the labor market; running a dynamic multinomial logit regression with unob-
served components ￿ la Wooldridge [2005] is possibly a good robustness check.
Duration analysis, time-varying e⁄ects and initial conditions are the issues
of our ongoing research.
8 Conclusions
One of the reasons why temporary contracts have been so widely introduced
in many Eurpean countries is to ease labor market entry for young workers.
Evaluating whether this mechanism holds is not our purpose. We are interested
in what happens in the following: are temporary jobs a port of entry towards
more stable career patterns, or do they engender state dependence? Using a
sample of entrants from WHIP, a large work histories dataset built up by LAB-
ORatorio R. Revelli from the Italian social security administration archives, and
after controlling for individual ￿xed e⁄ects, we ￿nd that i) heterogeneity plays a
non-negligible role in sorting the workers among the contracts; ii) whatever the
origin state of a worker, retaining the same contract is always the most likely
destination state, but iii) this evidence of state dependence does not prevent
temporary jobs, apprenticeship and mainly training programmes from being
stepping stones into permanent employment. These results are robust to the
average or legal duration of most of the contracts, and are not a⁄ected by pos-
sible start up period bias. The time elapsed between the entry on the labor
market and the ￿rst permanent job is therefore likely to play a crucial role.
Minor results say that a worker is more likely to be employed in the future if
she works today and that in order to get a permanent job self employees and
quasi subordinate workers should take an intermediate step, often represented
by a temporary job.
9 Appendix: the institutional framework
The years 1998 - 2004 cover the period immediately after the introduction of
agency contracts (Law 196/1997, also known as "Pacchetto Treu") and before
another comprehensive reform (the Law 30/2003, also called "Legge Biagi")
was actually implemented11. In the following we describe the main features of
the contracts we consider, with particular concern about maximum duration,
extension and repetition of temporary contracts. In general, the use of tem-
porary contracts to substitute workers on strike is forbidden and sequences of
temporary contracts face no limits provided the employer is di⁄erent.
11The Pacchetto Treu also included minor reforms to ￿xed term contracts and apprentice-
ship, promoted the di⁄usion of part-time jobs and CFLs and reintroduced probation contracts
(tirocinio). The Legge Biagi has been actually implemented at the end of 2004.
16￿ Permanent contracts can be broken through individual or collective
layo⁄s. Individual layo⁄s in Italy are in general forbidden unless a just
cause exists. However, the way wrongful individual layo⁄s are treated de-
pends on the ￿rm size: within large ￿rms (more than ￿fteen) the employer
is forced to re-hire the worker and to pay her a compensation; in small
￿rms only a compensation is due (from twice to ten times the last wage if
the worker￿ s tenure was larger than ten years). In large ￿rms layo⁄s occur
mainly through collective dismissals. Since 1991 collective dismissals are
admitted if i) the employer is planning to lay o⁄ at least ￿ve workers in
four months and ii) either a sharp reduction or a shutdown of the activity
is expected. Italian open ended contracts are therefore not so "permanent"
as common knowledge often believes.
￿ Fixed term contracts were introduced in Italy in 1962. At that time
they were admitted only in cases of occasional or unpredictable events. In
1978 ￿rms operating in trade or tourism industry have been allowed to use
￿xed term contracts in order to face demand upturns. In 1987 collective
bargaining has been entitled the de￿nition of the cases when ￿xed term
contracts are admitted. Their almost complete liberalization occurred in
2001. In general, there is no maximum duration for ￿xed term contracts.
Extensions are allowed up to a total of three years, but only if the initial
contract￿ s duration is lower. Sequences of ￿xed term jobs are allowed if
at least ten to twenty days elapse between two sucessive spells. These
limitations do not apply to seasonal activities.
￿ In 1984 the CFL (contratti di formazione e lavoro, work-and-train con-
tracts) were introduced. Through CFLs employers enjoy a sharp cost
reduction (a roughly 30% rebate on the Social Security fee and no ￿ring
costs) and provide to the worker a minimum of formal training. Eligible
people are workers 15 to 29 years old; the duration is 18 to 24 months and
no extension is allowed. Over the years many reforms took place: in 1988
the rebate decreased to 15%; in 1991 it has been furtherly reduced to 7%
in Northern and Central Italy, and to 12% in the South, where the target
population was extended to 15-32 years old workers. In 1993 the eligible
age became 16 to 32 years old all over Italy and the maximum duration
was reduced to 12 months for professional settling. Sequences of CFLs are
admitted conditional on a change in the training contents (see Contini et
al. [2003] for details).
￿ Apprenticeship was introduced in Italy in the early Fi￿ties. Similarly to
the CFLs, apprentices receive a minimum amount of external and on-the-
job training and the employer enjoy a sound Social Security fee reduction;
formally apprenticeship is not a temporary contract. Its minimum dura-
tion is 18 months and the maximum is 4 or 5 years. Apprentices are from
15 to 24 years old, but in some cases the maximum age at hiring can be 26
or even 29. At the end of the apprenticeship period the employer either
17dismiss the apprentice or retain her with a permanent contract. Sequences
of apprenticeship contracts are allowed.
￿ Agency contracts were introduced in 1997 (Law 196/97, also called
"Pacchetto Treu") and became e⁄ective in 199812. With agency contracts
the provider hires the worker either temporarily or permanently. In this
last case the worker receive an attendance allowance from the provider;
the share of permanent agency workers in Italy is negligible. In any case
the ￿rm pays the wage to the worker (without reductions) and a search
cost to the provider (between 20% and 30% of the wage). Agency work is
not allowed for low skilled or dangerous jobs and in ￿rms where collective
layo⁄s occurred in the previous twelve months. From 2000 agency workers
can be employed in low skilled jobs too. Collective bargaining stated that
the maximum share of temporary agency workers is between 8% and 13%
of the number of permanent workers of the ￿rm, depending on industry
and the speci￿c collective contract. Temporary agency contracts can be
extended up to four times for a maximum of 24 months (see Ichino et al.
[2003]).
￿ Collaborators. The contratti di collaborazione coordinata e continua-
tiva (often referred to as co.co.co. contracts) exist in the civil code since
the early Seventies but became easily observable through administrative
data only in 1996, after a dedicated public security fund was introduced
(Law 335/95, also called "Legge Dini"). Their main features are i) the
absence of a subordinate relationship with the employer (the collabora-
tor is formally a self-employee) and ii) a very limited social security fee
(10% of the gross wage; for dependent workers it is about 33%). Initially,
co.co.co. contracts were admitted only for non-manual jobs, but this limi-
tation disappeared in 2001. Over time major reforms concerned the social
security fee: for workers without any other public security fund it raised
to 12% in 1998, 13% in 2000, 14% in 2002 and about 18% - 19% in 2004.
Co.co.co. contracts can be extended and repeated at will; no maximum
duration is imposed. For analysis purposes collaborators are splitted into
several subgroups: i) non-managers without other incomes (the ones we
call "quasi-subordinate") ii) managers iii) collaborators with another in-
come whose source is either a pension or a dependent job (in these cases
the other activity is assumed to be the primary) iv) collaborators with
another income, whose source is unobservable (such observations are dis-
regarded) v) collaborators with more than one employer (see Berton et al.
[2005] for the details).
￿ Professionals and self-employees. WHIP accounts for all the profes-
sionals without an autonomous security fund, the artisans and the traders.
12For this reason the share of agency workers in our sample - the ￿ow of workers who entered
the labor market on 1998 - is really small.
18Since they are all proper self-employees13, there￿ s no room for questions
about maximum duration, extensions and repetetions.
We aggregated all the observable contracts: standard means permanent con-
tract (either subsidized or not subsidized - the large majority), temporary con-
tracts include ￿xed term contracts, temporary agency contracts and seasonal
workers, self-employees include artisans, traders, professionals and collabora-
tors under points ii) and v) above. Our analysis does not distinguish between
part time and full time jobs.
13Some doubts on the professionals we are able to observe actually emerge, but the empirical
evidence on this argument is poor.
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